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The South African (SA) private healthcare system is relatively well 
resourced, with substantially higher per capita spending than the 
public sector. Private healthcare inflation has been consistently 
higher than the consumer price index, making cover increasingly 
unaffordable.[1] In the light of these increases, which only a minority 
of South Africans can afford, the Competition Commission (CC) 
initiated the Health Market Inquiry (HMI) in 2013 to investigate and 
provide explanations for these increases in price and expenditure.[2]
Spanning 7 years, the HMI is the most systematic and 
comprehensive investigation that there has yet been into the SA 
private healthcare sector. The HMI Final Report,[3] published in 
September 2019, documents its findings and recommendations in 
over 250 pages. The recommendations merit extensive discussion 
and debate, as they could – if implemented – have far-reaching 
consequences for the future of the healthcare system.
This article is written in the context of significant proposed 
reform to the SA health system as outlined in the National Health 
Insurance (NHI) Bill,[4] which will have important implications for 
the design and regulation of the private healthcare sector. To improve 
the feasibility and sustainability of NHI, it is imperative that action 
is taken to address the many issues identified by the HMI in parallel 
with the incremental NHI implementation process. Well-regulated, 
efficient, responsive and affordable private voluntary health insurance 
will be key to achieving universal health coverage (UHC), aligned 
with the vision of NHI. The collapse of private insurance in SA, a 
very real risk if the HMI recommendations are not implemented, 
will only serve to delay UHC, and impede progressive realisation 
of the right to health for another generation. The objective of this 
article is to contribute to discussion by providing an overview of the 
key findings and recommendations of the HMI and highlight the 
resultant imperatives at this critical juncture of policy development.
Purpose and process
The HMI was initiated in response to concerns regarding affordability 
of private healthcare cover in SA. The Terms of Reference published 
in the Government Gazette on 29 November 2013 stated that the 
CC wanted the HMI ‘to establish whether there are any factors that 
prevent, distort or restrict competition in the private healthcare 
sector’ and to collect information to ‘provide a factual basis upon 
which the Commission can make evidence-based recommendations 
that serve to promote competition in the interest of a more affordable, 
accessible, innovative and good quality private healthcare’.
While Judge Sandile, Chairperson of the HMI panel, acknowledged 
‘that the crucial issue of equitable and fair access to good quality 
healthcare services does not rest entirely on competition’,[2] the 
HMI carried out its investigation primarily through a competitive 
lens to answer ‘whether there are features in the private healthcare 
markets for services and goods which harm competition or have the 
potential to harm competition’. Judge Sandile further noted that ‘A 
comprehensive commission of inquiry into the state of healthcare 
in both the public and private sectors may be more appropriate to 
evaluate the general state of healthcare services in South Africa in 
order to give effect to the constitutional right of access to healthcare 
services and goods guaranteed in section 27 of the Constitution.’[2]
The CC appointed a panel of six experts to conduct the HMI. The 
establishment phase involved setting up the platform for the inquiry 
process, and initial engagement with stakeholders. The evidence-
gathering phase entailed: (i) background research; (ii)  more than 
15 000 pages of written submissions from stakeholders, mainly 
technical data and information on various healthcare markets; 
(iii)  data from 175 stakeholders (including financial data and 
detailed claims data for 2010 - 2014 from 80 medical schemes); and 
(iv) public hearings and seminars on selected topics. The third phase 
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entailed analysis of the data and information collected, to determine 
expenditure and cost trends, profitability and market power. The 
fourth phase included the publication of the Provisional Report on 
5 July 2018[5] and an invitation to stakeholders to submit comments. 
Following review of the comments received, the Final Report was 
published on 30 September 2019.
Key findings and recommendations
The focus of the inquiry was the 8.8 million lives (total SA population 
53.7 million) covered by private health insurance. The key role 
players in the healthcare market identified by the HMI were the 
public health sector, regulatory bodies, medical product suppliers, 
private healthcare providers (practitioners, facilities, emergency 
services and pharmacies), private healthcare funders and industry 
bodies. The HMI focused largely on the interplay between private 
financers and providers, and the role of regulation and regulatory 
bodies governing that interaction.
Chapter 3 of the Report sets out the Competitive Assessments 
Framework, where the HMI assessed the competitive issues related 
to the private healthcare market. The framework comprised six 
‘harms to competition’ (any effect adverse to the realisation of more 
competitive outcomes for consumers). These included distortions in 
relation to: (i) financing; (ii) facilities; (iii) practitioners; (iv) barriers 
to entry, expansion, intervention and innovation; (v) imperfect 
information; and (vi) the regulatory framework.
In effect, the HMI relied on a broad microeconomic assessment 
framework. For the purposes of this article, we summarise the findings 
and recommendations within a more generic classic microeconomic 
framework as set out by Parkin et al.[6] and summarised in Table 1. 
The framework identifies four key conditions to be met for a 
market to be competitive: (i) no or limited market concentration, 
with a large number of buyers and sellers; (ii) free entry into and/
or exit from the market, with no or lower barriers to entry and exit; 
(iii) ‘transparency’ with regard to the product being bought/sold 
in the market – producers should be competing on the price and 
quality of a fairly homogeneous product; and (iv) perfect consumer 
information – consumers should be sufficiently informed to make an 
informed choice when purchasing the product. Although the HMI 
examined competitive issues at a more granular level, we use this 
framework to summarise the findings and recommendations broadly 
for (i) providers of healthcare services (providers), and (ii) funders of 
healthcare services (funders).
The overall conclusion of the HMI is that the private SA 
healthcare market suffers from multiple market failures from both 
provider and funder perspectives, with structural, behavioural and 
regulatory problems that harm competition and undermine access 
to healthcare. The HMI ascribes this situation to regulatory failure 
due to deregulation in the 1980s, followed by partial and incomplete 
re-regulation and failure to monitor and ensure regulatory compliance.
The provider-side problems and recommendations to address the 
problems are summarised in Table 1.
The HMI found that the combination of healthcare practitioners 
acting as agents for ill-informed individuals requiring healthcare and 
the perverse incentives associated with the largely fee-for-service 
remuneration environment facilitated supplier-induced demand; this 
was the key driver for increases in healthcare utilisation and costs.
The HMI found the healthcare facilities market to be highly 
concentrated, with three groups (Netcare, Mediclinic and Life) 
dominating and little evidence of competition between them; this led 
to the conclusion that the absence of any meaningful recent entry into 
the facilities market was suggestive of significant entry/exit barriers. 
The HMI found a lack of transparency in the services provided 
by facilities and providers, including a lack of price transparency 
and reporting on quality and outcomes, with non-compliance with 
protocols and guidelines. It also reported a lack of information and/
or communication from healthcare suppliers and facilities that would 
allow consumers to make informed choices.
The HMI recognised the need to improve the regulatory 
environment governing suppliers and recommended the 
establishment of a dedicated supply-side regulator of health (SSRH) 
Table 1. Provider problems and recommendations
Condition Problem Recommendations
Market concentration • Three dominant hospital groups
• Little evidence of competition between 
practitioners across specialties
• Improve regulatory environment by establishing 
an SSRH responsible for:
• Facility planning, including licensing
• Conducting economic value assessments of 
health technology and interventions
• Monitoring of health services
• Pricing of health services
• Implement interventions to promote competitive 
and value-based contracting, moving away from 
fee-for-service contracts
• Establish an OMRO
• Separate academic and business functions of 
practitioner associations
• Change HPCSA ethics rules to promote 
innovation in models of care
• Institute guidelines for associations to ensure that 
they are not anti-competitive
• Effect curriculum changes in training of health-
care practitioners to ensure greater awareness of 
cost implications of treatment decisions
Free entry/exit • No meaningful entry in past decade
Transparent product • No price transparency
• Lack of reporting on quality, outcomes
• Non-compliance with protocols and guidelines
• Fee for service – perverse incentives
Perfect consumer information • Practitioners act as agents
SSRH = supply-side regulator of health; OMRO = outcome monitoring and reporting organisation; HPCSA = Health Professions Council of South Africa.
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with four main functions: (i) facility planning (including licensing); 
(ii) economic value assessments; (iii) monitoring of services; and 
(iv) pricing. A primary concern is the high level of national and local 
concentration in the hospital market and the need to implement 
and update the provisions on the Certificate of Need in the National 
Health No. 61 of 2003.[7] 
The funder-side problems and recommendations to address them 
are summarised in Table 2.
Overall, the HMI concluded that ‘funders compete in an 
environment which is characterized by an incomplete regulatory 
framework, so distorting the parameters of competition’. The HMI 
found the funder market to be highly concentrated, with 70% of 
insured lives in two medical schemes (Discovery Health and GEMS 
(Government Employees Medical Scheme)) and 76% of insured lives 
administered by two companies (Discovery Health and Medscheme). 
The HMI concluded that there was little competition and that 
funders, together with administrators and managed care companies, 
had failed to manage supplier-induced demand or moral hazard. 
Competition between schemes to improve affordability and value-
for-money cover was limited: instead schemes competed based on 
risk factors, such as attracting healthier members.
The complexity of the offerings by medical schemes (270 products) 
made it difficult for consumers to compare and make informed 
choices. Consumer information was incomplete, and the role 
of brokers and other agents in directing consumer choice was 
questionable. The HMI further concluded that scheme and member 
interests were misaligned, with limited incentives to ensure that 
scheme employees and trustees act in the best interests of members 
and hold administrators to account.
The HMI funder recommendations ‘are designed to complete the 
regulatory framework, and to create a market environment conducive 
to effective competition on pro-consumer metrics’. While funders 
were better regulated than suppliers, regulation was incomplete and 
needed to be improved. Interestingly, while the HMI recognises that 
mandatory cover would address the problem of anti-selection, it 
recommends that the ‘industry needs to show clear indications of 
close alignment to consumer interests and better cost containment’ 
before mandatory cover is introduced. To ‘remove the current 
incentive for schemes to compete on low level competitive factors 
such as attracting a younger population’, the HMI recommends the 
implementation of a risk-adjustment mechanism (RAM) and income 
cross-subsidisation to mitigate the impacts on scheme costs.
To address the issue of product transparency and homogeneity and 
consumer information, the HMI recommends the implementation of 
a standardised package of benefits, explicitly defined and offered by 
all schemes, with supplementary packages provided in a transparent 
manner. It further recommends that the standard package be 
based on revised Prescribed Minimum Benefits (PMB), covering 
catastrophic expenditure and some level of out-of-hospital and 
primary care, with a view to encouraging reduced use of higher levels 
of care. The package should be based on assessments conducted by 
an SSRH economic value assessment unit using health technology 
assessment (HTA) and clinical treatment protocols to encourage 
effectiveness and efficiency. The HMI concludes that establishing an 
appropriate regulatory framework is necessary to facilitate innovative 
and alternative models of care that permit interprofessional and 
interdisciplinary group practice; this would have a positive effect on 
the provision of care and prevent revenue-maximising behaviour.
A number of recommendations were aimed at enhancing 
governance, including more stringent reporting requirements, review 
of reimbursement requirements to better align scheme and member 
interests, minimum education and training standards for trustees 
and principal officers, and steps to encourage member participation 
in trustee election.
Key imperatives
The findings and recommendations of the HMI are broad and wide 
ranging, though neither profound nor unexpected, especially from 
a process that cost at least ZAR196 million and took 7 years to 
complete. At a broader level, the HMI process and outcomes highlight 
the need for a review of policy development and co-ordination 
processes. If government is committed to healthcare for all, would 
a more comprehensive inquiry into the state of healthcare in both 
the public and private sectors – as recommended by the chairman 
of the HMI panel – not have been more appropriate? Alternatively, if 
government is committed to NHI as the solution to the problems of 
healthcare, the usefulness of a major enquiry into private healthcare 
at this time must be questioned.
In any event, the HMI recommendations need to be contextualised 
within the broader political context of healthcare policy and planning 
initiatives, especially the government’s intention to address the 
inequities and failings of the two-tiered SA healthcare system 
through the proposed NHI. Within this context, it makes sense 
to prioritise the HMI recommendations that not only assist in 
Table 2. Funder problems and recommendations
Condition Problems Recommendations
Market concentration • High level of concentration in schemes and 
administrators
• Lack of competition among funders and 
administrators
• Scheme and member interests not aligned
• Failure to manage supplier-induced demand,  
moral hazard
• Introduce single, comprehensive, standardised 
base benefit option
• Introduce a risk-adjustment mechanism
• Review contracts to ensure move to value-based 
contracting
• Review training requirements and incentives for 
boards of trustees and principal officers
• Introduce an active opt-in system for brokers
• Continue with existing CMS functions
• Review PMB
• Review governance
• Improve anti-selection measures
Free entry/exit • No meaningful entry in past decade
Transparent product • Multiple product offerings
• Lack of transparency and comparability
Perfect consumer information • Incomplete information
• Distortions due to brokers and other intermediaries
CMS = Council for Medical Schemes; PMB = Prescribed Minimum Benefits.
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improving the current healthcare environment but are also necessary 
for the successful implementation of NHI.
Taking into account the above, the HMI provider-side 
recommendations, and in particular the recommendation to establish 
the SSRH, should be a major implementation priority to address 
some of the major problems in the current healthcare environment. 
This is also necessary for the NHI environment; while NHI would 
have power as a funding body, it would have no regulatory powers 
and would have to rely on a suitably empowered regulatory body to 
deal with supplier regulatory issues. There is also a need for a major 
review of the regulatory environment of the statutory councils that 
govern health professionals.
The introduction of an economic value assessment unit within 
the SSRH or as an independent entity is a particularly low-hanging 
fruit. Through such an entity, the benefit package can be explicitly 
defined[8] through the inclusion of cost-effective interventions 
enabled by HTA. The establishment of an economic value assessment 
unit would ease pressure on the Council for Medical Schemes by 
alleviating the need to make coverage decisions on a case-by-case 
basis and contribute to the determination of a revised standardised 
benefits package, a highly urgent task as the last substantial revision 
to the PMB was almost 20 years ago. Crucially, this unit could inform 
and later merge with the HTA and benefits package design process 
envisioned under NHI. There would be highly useful synergies in 
a common institution providing economic assessment in both the 
public and private healthcare sectors, noting critical differences 
between the decision frameworks underpinning a regulated standard 
benefits package under a voluntary health insurance mechanism 
(constrained by criteria such as average premium relative to national 
household income and scheme viability) and the comprehensive 
package of benefits under a tax-based UHC mechanism under 
NHI (constrained by total government health expenditure). Should 
voluntary health insurance be restricted to supplementary care, 
following full implementation of NHI (in 2026 at the earliest) the 
differentiation between a regulated private insurance package and 
the publicly funded package may become more stark, but both sectors 
would still require economic assessments to determine efficiency, 
effectiveness and equity.
A critical concern in the recommendations relating to an economic 
value assessment unit is the institutional capacity, human resources 
and research funding required to support economic value assessment 
of all services within the base benefit package. The HMI correctly 
determined that the current absence of regulations on HTA is a 
significant regulatory failure, yet no interim recommendations 
are made as to how the institutional capacities should be 
developed. International experience indicates that comprehensive 
HTA functionality requires dedicated, stepwise strategies related 
to institutional development and skills and knowledge capacity 
strengthening.[9] These strategies cannot be limited to NHI processes 
only and should be funded, developed and implemented urgently.
The case for the HMI funder recommendations is less clear cut. 
There is currently a need for regulatory coherence between the 
Council for Medical Schemes and the Health Professions Council of 
South Africa. The publication of the Medical Schemes Amendment 
Bill[10] prior to completion of the HMI underlines the question 
of co-ordination between statutory bodies. While some of the 
HMI recommendations have been incorporated into the Medical 
Schemes Amendment Bill, the establishment of the RAM, a key 
recommendation, was not, and it remains unclear whether it will be 
adopted.
Conclusions
The efficiency of the process used for the HMI can be questioned, 
and the findings are neither profound nor unexpected. However, the 
recommendations are important and should be acted upon, as they 
will not only assist in improving the current healthcare environment 
but are critical for successful implementation of NHI.
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